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context
bel(System, bel(Simon, happy(David)))
bel(System, goal(Simon, bel(System, happy(David))))
inform(Simon, System,happy(David))
bel(System, bel(Simon, deleted(_,sub_directory)
bel(System, bel(Simon, bel(System,
bel(System, bel(Simon, deleted(System,
i. bel(System, bel(Simon, not(happy(David))))
ii. bel(System, bel(Simon, bel(System, deleted(_,sub_directory) -> not(happy(David)))))
ascribe(Simon, System, deleted(_,sub_directory)
modus_ponens(System, deleted(_,sub_directory) ->
deleted(System, sub_directory),
not(happy(David)))
iii. bel(System, bel(Simon, bel(System, not(happy(David)))))
bel(System, goal(Simon, bel(Sys, not(happy(David)))
 not(happy(David),
 deleted(System, sub_directory))))
 sub_directory)))
accept_belief(Simon, bel(System,
-> not(happy(David))))
blocks
blocks
goal accomplished
Figure 2: A recognised plan explaining Simon’s infelicity
-> not(happy(David))))))
 deleted(System, sub_directory)))))
level beliefs explaining the role the first set of beliefs play
in the speaker’s plan. Pollack’s idea of ascribing a set of
beliefs based on the intentions contained in the recognised
plan is similar to our own though she does not discuss
how conversational implicatures can be dealt with or con-
sider deception.
Utsumi [Utsumi, 1996] presents a unified theory of
irony which includes a concept of insincerity. He argues
that there are three properties: allusion, pragmatic insin-
cerity and emotive attitude. Given two of these properties,
the third can be inferred and the utterance judged ironic.
His concept of pragmatic insincerity refers to the utter-
ance either flouting a speech act’s felicity conditions or a
pragmatic principle such as the maxim of quantity
[Grice, 1975], the politeness principle [Leech, 1983], or
the principle of relevance [Sperber and Wilson, 1986].
Utsumi’s concept of pragmatic insincerity is clearly
related to ours. However, he presents no way of determin-
ing whether the pragmatic insincerity is intended or due to
deception or mistaken belief. Utsumi’s work is also more
general than ours in that we only consider felicity condi-
tions whereas Utsumi appeals to a wide range of prag-
matic theories for his concept of sincerity. However,
principles such as politeness and relevance are too under-
specified to be computationally usable. It is an open
research question whether such principles are required.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
In the sections above, we have shown that the belief atti-
tudes often found in non-cooperative dialogue can be
used in cooperative dialogue to recognise and understand
a class of conversational implicature.
However, it is clear that our definition of deception is
too strict for use in all but the most simple cases of non-
cooperative deceptive dialogues. Clearly, sophisticated
uses of deception involve more than the flouting of the
felicity conditions of a single speech act. For example, a
speaker may attempt to establish a proposition earlier in
the dialogue to validate the conditions of the main decep-
tion or attempt to mislead the hearer by seizing the initia-
tive of the dialogue to draw it away from the actual
subject of the deception.
The main use of these definitions is in distinguishing
such cases from where the speaker is attempting to com-
municate an implicature in cooperative dialogue. In this
paper, we have avoided actually trying to define the class
of implicature and instead defined conditions for what is
not in the class. Whether this is theoretically adequate is
an open question.
not(P)))))
If the System can construct such a belief by ascription
after the speaker’s utterance then it can recognise that the
speaker is attempting to communicate an implicature by
appearing to flout a felicity condition.
As noted in section 2, ViewGen constructs belief envi-
ronments as required, representing explicit beliefs only
when necessary. In such a case, the act of distinguishing
the utterance as pragmatic, typically results in a series of
belief ascriptions as the cases of deception and mistaken
belief are eliminated and the utterance recognised as
cooperative. Because agents are able to simulate each
other as nested environments, it is possible for a speaker
to plan the hearer making such belief ascriptions in order
to understand his or her utterance and intend such ascrip-
tions as the non-conventional, context sensitive aspect of
the meaning of the utterance.
For example, reconsider the dialogue exchange in (1).
Suppose initially, the System holds the following atti-
tudes:
goal(System, bel(Simon, deleted(System,
sub_directory)))
bel(System, deleted(System, sub_directory))
bel(System, deleted(_, sub_directory)
-> not(happy(David)))
bel(System, bel(Simon, deleted(_, sub_directory)
-> not(happy(David))))
After the System’s act of informing that the subdirectory
has been deleted, the following beliefs can be stereotypi-
cally ascribed by the System to Simon:
bel(System, bel(Simon, bel(System, deleted(System,
sub_directory))))
bel(System, bel(Simon, goal(System, bel(Simon,
deleted(System, sub_directory)))))
After recognising Simon’s act of informing that David
will not be happy, the System can attempt to ascribe the
following attitudes based on the felicity conditions of the
speech act:
bel(System, bel(Simon, happy(David)))
bel(System, goal(Simon, bel(System, happy(David))))
However, the first belief is blocked due to the contrary evi-
dence in Simon’s belief environment since it contains the
belief that deleting a sub-directory will result in David not
being happy and the belief that the System has deleted the
sub-directory. These propositions licence the inference
that Simon believes David is, in fact, not happy, i.e.
i. bel(System, bel(Simon, not(happy(David))))
Since this blocks the ascription of the first felicity con-
dition of Simon’s speech act, the system must then attempt
to reason whether the utterance is a case of mistaken
belief, deception or a use of implicature. For the latter, the
System must attempt to derive:
bel(System, bel(Speaker, bel(System, bel(Speaker,
not(P)))))
The System can simulate Simon ascribing to the System
the belief that deleting the sub-directory will make David
unhappy to derive:
ii. bel(System, bel(Simon, bel(System,
deleted(_, sub_directory) -> not(happy(David)))))
and then the System can simulate Simon simulating the
System using this proposition to infer that David will not
be happy, i.e.
iii. bel(System, bel(Simon, bel(Sytem,
not(happy(David)))))
Inferring beliefs i and iii, allows the System to elimi-
nate the possibility of an act of deception or mistaken
belief by Simon. This matches the requirements for rec-
ognising that the speaker must be intending an implica-
ture by his utterance. It is therefore necessary to attempt
to understand what the content of the implicature is.
This interpretation depends not on the conventional
effects of the speech act, since its felicity conditions are
believed to have been disobeyed; but rather the context
sensitive effects caused by the hearer attempting to recog-
nise that the speaker is attempting to be pragmatically
communicative. In attempting to interpret the pragmatic
content of Simon’s utterance, the System therefore must
derive a plan which involves at least one of these effects
as a sub-goal of a goal which can be stereotypically
ascribed.
Such a plan is shown in Figure 2. From the belief iii,
the System derives that Simon believed that the System
now believes that David is not happy by the System’s
action of deleting the subdirectory. This is a stereotypical
goal which can be ascribed to Simon and therefore, an
acceptable interpretation.. The goal ascription blocks the
second felicity condition of the original inform act of
holding a goal to get the System to believe the opposite.
Therefore, Simon’s utterance can be interpreted as a use
of irony where the intended meaning is opposite to the
conventional meaning.
6 Related work
Perrault [Perrault, 1990] presents a theory of speech acts
based on default logic. Using a definition of belief and
intention expressed in the logic, he defines a set of default
rules for speech act performance and considers the appli-
cation of such rules to cases of deception and mistaken
belief. Because of their default nature, prior inferences
can be retracted to deal with such problematic cases. Per-
rault’s work can be seen as a basis for our own. The idea
of default rules for the speech act effects is similar in
many respects to our concept of ascription. However, our
work extends to link the elimination of deception and
mistaken belief to the inference of conversational impli-
cature.
Pollack [Pollack, 1990] presents an account of plan
recognition which deals with the possibility of mistaken
belief on the part of the speaker by ascribing a set of
beliefs associated with his or her plan plus a set of meta
set is shown in Figure 1(ii). However, because of the Sys-
tem holding the contrary belief not(P), the communicated
belief cannot be accepted by the System as a primitive
belief by the use of an Accept_belief operator.
4.3 Cases of deception and mistaken belief
In the above two subsections, we have distinguished para-
digm cases of deception and mistaken belief based on the
beliefs of the system of the speaker’s actual beliefs. When
an utterance is recognised, the conventional felicity condi-
tions can be ascribed to the speaker. If these conditions are
not believed to be true by the system then if there is evi-
dence of deception, i.e., the System explicitly believes
that the speaker holds a belief contrary to the utterance
then the deception update rule can be applied and plan
recognition based on this deception attempted.
However, it is more common for the system to hold no
explicit belief on the speaker’s personal beliefs with
respect to the utterance prior to communication. Such a
situation would occur if the System only holds its own
personal belief about the status of P i.e.,
bel(System, not(P))
Without any further information about the speaker’s
beliefs, it is clearly not possible to guess correctly whether
the speaker is being deceptive or truthful but mistaken.
However, it is possible that the speaker is being neither
deceptive or mistaken but attempting to communicate a
conversational implicature. The understanding of such is
given in section 5.
4.4 Plan recognition with mistaken beliefs
and deception
ViewGen’s nested representation of attitudes allows a
consistent method with dealing with conflicting beliefs
[Ballim and Wilks, 1991]. It is simple to represent con-
flicting belief environments held by agents and to con-
struct and add nested beliefs using ascription. Since both
types of ascription are blocked by contrary evidence, it is
possible to reason about which mental attitudes an agent
holds even if the agent shows evidence of a mistaken
belief or is being deceptive.
In the case of a mistaken belief, ViewGen is able to
plan from the utterance and the context of the speaker’s
belief environment as usual. Additional beliefs can be
ascribed into the environment as required as long as they
are not blocked by the mistaken belief.
Like any utterance, an act of deception is motivated to
achieve goals by the speaker. It is, therefore, possible to
use plan recognition to reason about the speaker’s dia-
logue plan. Such cases require that the System assumes
that the speaker believes the deception will be successful.
For example, in the above case, the belief set ascribed to
John in Figure 1(i) can be used to generate a plan with
John’s belief set as the initial context via the ascribed goal
of deception to some ascribable goal.
However, in general, the above definition of deception
is too strict. In most situations, the system will not have
the nested beliefs required to recognise genuine cases of
deception. The recognition of deception and its motiva-
tion is clearly a form of keyhole recognition i.e. unaided
and unintended by the speaker and difficult at best. How-
ever, as shown in Section 5, such a definition can be used
to eliminate the possibility of deception and mistaken
belief in cases where the speaker intends the hearer to rec-
ognise the utterance as a conversational implicature.
Ostensible but intentionally recognisable infelicities are
commonly used to communicate information by coopera-
tive plan recognition.
5. Making inferences from infelicities
In this section, we briefly describe an extension of the the-
ory of speech act understanding described in section 3.
Our theory is based on the idea that recognising and dis-
tinguishing that the utterance is not a case of deception or
mistaken belief and, therefore, a conversational implica-
ture results in a set of ascribed beliefs which constitute the
meaning of the implicature.
Given such an utterance, it is first essential to recog-
nise that the speaker is attempting an act of cooperative
communication rather than being deceptive or holding a
mistaken belief. Such recognition involves eliminating
the possibility of the speaker intending deception or hold-
ing a mistaken belief. In the case of eliminating a case of
mistaken belief, the System must have an explicit evi-
dence that the speaker believes the contrary belief. That
is, if P is the mistaken belief then:
bel(System, bel(Speaker, not(P)))
If the speaker intends that the System interpret his or
her utterance pragmatically then they must believe that
this contrary evidence is believed by the System prior to
performing the speech act i.e.
bel(Speaker, bel(System, bel(Speaker, not(P))))
In the case of any genuine act of deception by the speaker,
he or she must believe that the intended deception was
successful i.e. not detected by the hearer as such. As
argued above, detection of deception requires, if P is the
communicated proposition, that the System holds the fol-
lowing attitude:
bel(System, bel(Speaker, not(P)))
Therefore, if the speaker is to be sure that the utterance
cannot be recognised as a deception, he or she must hold
the following belief:
bel(Speaker, bel(System, bel(Speaker, not(P))))
This is the same belief as required for preventing the
interpretation of mistaken belief. For the System to recog-
nise that the utterance is neither a case of deception or
mistaken belief, it must therefore nest this belief to elimi-
nate either possibility i.e.:
bel(System, bel(Speaker, bel(System, bel(Speaker,
Belief
Belief
David
System
i) An instance of speaker deception
David Goal
System
Belief
David Belief
Belief
Belief
David
System
David Goal
System
Belief
ii) An instance of mistaken belief
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Figure 1: A graphical distinction between deception and mistaken belief
4 Cases of deception and mistaken belief
An act of deception occurs when a speech act is per-
formed intentionally to communicate a false proposition.
Deception can be identified when the inferred mental atti-
tudes behind the utterance disagree with the hearer’s prior
beliefs about the speaker. However, cases of deception
need to be distinguished from cases of mistaken belief.
This is problematic since mistaken beliefs are also recog-
nised when the speaker’s reported mental attitudes are
inconsistent with what the hearer believes to be true. For
example, consider the following utterance:
If P represents not(present(Mark)) then David has per-
formed the following Inform act:
Inform(David, System, P)
As noted above, the Inform act stereotypically provides
justification for the following ascriptions by the System:
bel(System, bel(David, P))
bel(System, goal(David, bel(System, P)))
So far, in constructing the resultant belief environ-
ment, we have assumed that there are no prior assump-
tions about the speaker’s belief space. However, prior
beliefs strongly affect the interpretation of any utterance’s
meaning. The following two subsections demonstrate the
use of such beliefs in recognising cases of deception and
mistaken belief.
4.1 Deception by the speaker
Consider, the case where the following beliefs are present
prior to the utterance:
bel(System, not(P))
bel(System, bel(David, not(P))
That is, the System believes not P and believes that David
also holds this belief. When the Inform act is performed
(2). David: Mark isn’t here.
then the latter belief blocks the ascription of the System
believing that David believes P since it constitutes con-
trary evidence. However, the ascription of David having a
goal of getting the System to believe P succeeds.
In cases of deception, it is clear that the speaker has a
goal of getting the hearer to believe that the speaker holds
a communicated proposition, so that in the case above,
David is attempting to convince the System that he holds
the proposition. That is:
goal(David, bel(System, bel(David, P)))
This attitude can be ascribed in the same manner as any
felicity condition so that the hearer’s belief can be
updated thus:
bel(System, goal(David, bel(System, bel(David, P))))
This is a paradigm case of deception and can be general-
ised into the following rule:
The application of this rule and the conventional update
rule would result in the belief set shown in Figure 1(i).
4.2 Mistaken belief on the part of the speaker
Clearly, cases of deception and honest mistaken belief
must be distinguished. Consider, by contrast; the case
where the following beliefs are present:
bel(System, not(P))
bel(System, bel(David, P))
That is, the System believes not(P) but believes that
David holds the contrary belief. When the Inform act is
performed, there is no contradiction in the conventional
ascriptions associated with informing. The updated belief
Update on the Hearer’s belief set in the case of deception
For every fraudulently communicated condition C in
default_ascribe(Hearer, Speaker, goal(Speaker,
 dialogue act performed:
bel(Hearer,C)))
Finally, in Section 6, we compare our theory with other
approaches.
2 ViewGen
ViewGen [Wilks et al., 1991] is a dialogue understanding
system which reasons about the attitudes of other agents
in nested belief structures. It does this by ascription - i.e.
assuming that attitudes held in one attitude box can be
ascribed to others. There are two main methods of ascrip-
tion - default ascription and stereotypical ascription.
Default ascription applies to common attitudes which
ViewGen assumes that any agent will hold and also
ascribe to any other agent unless there is contrary evi-
dence. Stereotypical ascription applies to stereotypical
attitudes which ViewGen assumes apply to instances of a
particular stereotype e.g.: ViewGen ascribes expert medi-
cal knowledge to doctors. Stereotypes can also apply to
types of dialogue. For example, knowledge elicitation
goals can be ascribed to agents involved in information
seeking dialogues. Where as default ascriptions can be
applied to any agent, stereotypical ascription requires the
precondition of some trigger for the stereotype to be
applied. For example, the use of a particular speech act
stereotypically assumes the holding of certain attitudes.
ViewGen is capable of recognising and using a set of
speech acts [Lee and Wilks, 1996b]. The acts are specified
as plan operators which are used to plan what is said and
recognise dialogue plans from the user. For example,
informing is specified as:
where the predicates goal and bel refer to goals and
beliefs.
Rather than specify the effects of an act, there are sep-
arate ascription rules for the speaker and hearer of any act:
This account differs from standard accounts of compu-
tational speech acts (e.g. [Allen, 1983]) in that the under-
lying operation of ascription takes over implicitly many of
the conditions and effects that are specified explicitly in
other approaches. For example, the Inform act given
above creates the following belief ascriptions on the part
of the hearer:
bel(Hearer, goal(Speaker,bel(Hearer,Proposition)))
bel(Hearer, bel(Speaker,Proposition))
This highlights an important point about the definition
of speech acts. Whether an Inform act succeeds depends
on the communication of the speaker’s mental state and
Inform(Speaker,Hearer,Proposition)
Preconditions: goal(Speaker,bel(Hearer,Proposition))
bel(Speaker,Proposition)
For every condition C in a dialogue act performed:
ascribe(Speaker, Hearer, bel(C))
Update on the Speaker’s belief set
Update on the Hearer’s belief set
For every condition C in a dialogue act performed:
ascribe(Hearer, Speaker, C)
not the actual intended effect of the act i.e. getting the
hearer to believe P. This is the case in all speech acts -
rather than define acts by effect, they are defined in terms
of their conventional preconditions and their success or
failure depends on the communication of these belief
based preconditions. This allows acts to be planned by
their minimal, context free effects. Further effects due to
the context, e.g. whether the Inform act actually updates
the hearer’s personal belief of the communicated proposi-
tion, are separate from the act and modelled as further
inferences or ascriptions in the dialogue plan. For exam-
ple, there is an Accept_belief plan operator which allows
the hearer to accept a speaker’s belief if 1) there is no con-
trary evidence; 2) the speaker is a reliable source of infor-
mation (i.e. an expert in the domain in question etc.). This
allows a clear representation of how the conventional
meaning of an utterance interacts with the context to pro-
duce a non-conventional effect such as in the case of an
indirect speech act.
3 Plan recognition in ViewGen
ViewGen explicitly plans every belief ascription from the
effects of an utterance to the desired interpretation, which
results in an explicit representation of the speaker’s inten-
tions which can be used for further inference.
ViewGen plans its communicative goals using a par-
tial order clausal link planner [McAllester and
Rosenblatt, 1991]. The planner is also used to understand
utterances by plan recognition. Given a communicative
act, ViewGen attempts to generate a plan involving the
act which results in goals which it can ascribe to the
speaker. Ascribable goals are stereotypical goals for what
is known about the user or context. Understanding can be
seen as a form of ascription where ViewGen has to reason
about which beliefs, goals and intentions are ascribed to
the modelled agent. Further discussion of ViewGen’s
speech act representation and ascription are given in [Lee
and Wilks, 1996a,Lee and Wilks, 1996b].
Plan recognition proceeds as follows: given an utter-
ance, its minimal meaning is derived from its surface
form. An utterance’s minimal meaning is the set of com-
municated attitudes associated with the speech act of the
utterance. The planner then attempts to generate a plan
which connects the utterance with one or more ascribable
goals. If the plan derived is inefficient i.e. fails to achieve
the ascribed goals in the most direct manner possible,
ViewGen assesses the speaker’s plan by re-planning from
the initial context to the ascribed goal. It then ascribes
additional goals to the planning agent to explain the rec-
ognised plan’s divergence from the “optimal plan”. The
optimal plan is considered to be the shortest the planner
can generate from the context to the goal state. For exam-
ple, the speaker might choose a particular dialogue plan to
avoid mentioning a particular topic or diverge so that he
or she can accomplish another goal implicitly.
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Abstract
Conversational implicatures are usually described as being
licensed by the disobeying or flouting of some principle by
the speaker in cooperative dialogue. However, such work
has failed to distinguish cases of the speaker flouting such
a principle from cases where the speaker is either deceptive
or holds a mistaken belief. In this paper, we demonstrate
how the three different cases can be distinguished in terms
of the beliefs ascribed to the speaker of the utterance. We
argue that in the act of distinguishing the speaker's inten-
tion and ascribing such beliefs, the intended inference can
be made by the hearer. This theory is implemented in
ViewGen, a pre-existing belief modelling system used in a
medical counselling domain.
1 Introduction
Previous work in pragmatics has described how speakers
can communicate more than what is explicitly said by the
flouting of normative principles such as those of coopera-
tion [Grice, 1975], or the felicity conditions of an utter-
ance’s speech act [Searle, 1969]. Such theories have
proved to be computationally underspecified or intractable.
Underlying such principles has been a notion of truthful-
ness yet dialogue exchanges such as shown in (1):
where the response is probably false, have received little
attention in computational work. This is due to the lack of a
clear distinction between cases of mistaken belief, inten-
tional deception and ostensively deceptive but pragmati-
cally felicitious communication. For example, in (1)
Simon’s reply can be regarded as ironic, deceptive or just a
case of Simon holding a mistaken belief depending on
whether the dialogue was cooperative, non-cooperative or
possibly conflictive.
In this paper, we discuss an initial distinction between
such cases with respect to the speaker’s mental attitudes
and show how it can be used to recognise and understand a
class of conversational implicature [Grice, 1975]. This the-
ory is implemented in ViewGen, a computer program
(1). System: I just deleted the subdirectory
Simon: David will be happy
which models the propositional attitudes of agents engaged
in dialogue. ViewGen is implemented in Quintus prolog
and currently we are investigating its use in a medical
counselling domain where conflictive and deceptive dia-
logues are common.
Our theory is summarised as follows: Previous accounts
of dialogue understanding have assumed that dialogues are
cooperative in a Gricean sense so that the participants are
truthful, informative but not verbose, relevant and clear.
However, such assumptions ignore the possibility of con-
flicting beliefs and goals on the part of the participants.
Acts of deception and cases of mistaken belief have dis-
tinct belief conditions which the hearer can recognise. In
using plan recognition to understand the meaning of a
speaker’s utterance, it is essential to first ascribe the correct
set of beliefs to the speaker. The understanding of utter-
ances based on either deception or mistaken beliefs is a
form of keyhole recognition [Carberry, 1990] which is dif-
ficult in practice. However, both sets of belief conditions
can be used in the recognition and understanding of conver-
sational implicature in cooperative dialogue.
If the speaker is attempting to implicate some additional
meaning then he or she must assume that the hearer will
recognise their attempt as such. This is only possible if the
speaker is sure that the hearer can eliminate the possibility
of deception or mistaken belief on the part of the speaker.
Our claim is that the process of eliminating such cases as
possible interpretations forces the hearer to make additional
belief ascriptions which the speaker can rely on to commu-
nicate conversational implicatures.
The paper is structured as follows: in Sections 2 and 3
we describe ViewGen, a belief model which explicitly rep-
resents belief ascription and inference, and its use in plan
recognition. In Section 4, we attempt to distinguish clear
cases of mistaken belief and deception. Our claim is that
for a conversational implicature to be recognised, such
interpretations must be eliminated. Therefore, a belief set
which eliminates both cases is presented as a condition for
interpreting the utterance as an implicature. In Section 5,
we show that the intermediate steps involved in elimination
can be used to infer the intended content of the implicature.
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